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   Sciences-­‐po	  Paris,	  Law	  School	  	  1.	  As	  attested	  by	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  literature1	  and	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	   claims	   before	   arbitrators2,	   the	   human	   rights3	  ordeal	   now	   facing	   investment	  arbitration	   is	   the	   result	   of	   increasing	   unease	   generated	   by	   the	   contemporary	  quasi-­‐worldwide	   foreign	   investment	  regime.	   	   It	   is	  well	  known	  that	   this	  regime,	  which	  rests	  largely	  on	  a	  massive	  number	  of	  bilateral	  treaties	  (BITS)4,	  was	  born	  of	  
                                                1	  See	   for	   example,	   a	   series	   of	   excellent	   studies	   approaching	   the	   intersection	   between	   the	  investment	   regime	  and	  human	   rights	   through	  analysis	  of	   arbitration	   cases:	   Luke	  Eric	  Peterson	  and	   Kevin	   R.	   Gray,	   “International	   Human	   Rights	   in	   Bilateral	   Investment	   Treaties	   and	   in	  Investment	   Treaty	   Arbitration”,	   Research	   paper	   prepared	   by	   the	   International	   Institute	   for	  
Sustainable	  Development	   (IISD)	   for	   the	   Swiss	   Department	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   April	   2003;	  Marc 
Jacobs, “International	   Investment	   Agreements	   and	   Human	   Rights”,	   INEF	   Research	   Paper	  Series	  Human	   Rights,	   Corporate	   Responsibility	   And	   Sustainable	   Development	   03/2010;	   Ursula	  Kriebaum,	  Privatizing	  Human	  Rights.	   The	   Interface	   between	   International	   Investment	  Protection	  
and	  Human	  Rights,	   A.	   REINISCH	  &	   U.	   KRIEBAUM	   (EDS.),	   The	   Law	   of	   International	   Relations	   –	  Liber	  Amicorum	  Hanspeter	  Neuhold,	  165-­‐189.	  ©	  2007	  ELEVEN	  INTERNATIONAL	  PUBLISHING.	  Printed	  in	  The	  Netherlands.	  
2 For an excellent overview of the cases, see Urula	  Kriebaum,	  op	  cit, p.167 et s.  	  3	  Whose	  version,	  which	  generation,	  of	  human	  rights	  are	  we	  talking	  about	  here?	  It	  seems	  sensible	  to	   follow	   much	   of	   the	   literature	   and	   to	   treat	   them	   them	   generically,	   as	   widely	   accepted	  fundamental	   values	   in	   comparative	   constitutional	   and	   international	   law,	   whether	   regional	   or	  universal,	   first	   (liberal	   individual	   rights)	   or	   second	   (social	   and	   economic	   rights)	   or	   even	   third	  generation	   (environmental	   rights).	  While	   it	   is	   true	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   assumes	   the	   liberal	  framework	   in	   which	   (at	   least	   the	   first	   generation	   of)	   such	   rights	   are	   designed,	   this	   does	   not	  prevent	  robust	  critique	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  international	  investment	  law	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	   its	  arbitration	  mechanism	   functions	   to	   support	   it.	  As	  Olivier	  de	  Schutter	  has	   shown	   in	  a	  different	  context,	  implementation	  of	  a	  fundamental	  right	  to	  food	  can	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  questioning	  the	  whole	  system	  in	  which	  these	  rights	  are	  inevitably	  embedded	  and	  might,	  if	  endorsed,	  carry	  far	  reaching	   re-­‐distributive	   consequences	   (Olivier De Schutter & Kaitlin Y Cordes, Accounting 
for Hunger. The Right to Food in the Era of Globalisation, Hart, 2011, specially, O de 




a	  widespread	  distrust	  of	   customary	  public	   international	   law,	   seen	  as	  providing	  too	  volatile	  an	  environment	  for	  the	  foreign	  investment	  required	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  development.	  But	  while	  development	  economics	  still	  posits	  that	  the	  inflow	  of	  capital	  is	  vital	  to	  ensure	  the	  needs	  of	  populations	  in	  terms	  of	  access	  to	  essential	  public	   infrastructures	   and	   services,	   the	   distribution	   of	   rights	   and	   obligations	  	  within	  the	  treaty	  regime,	  along	  with	  the	  accompanying	  arbitration	  process	  which	  upholds	   it,	   is	   progressively	   stigmatized	   as	   imbalanced	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	  host	  state,	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  private	  foreign	  investor.	  This	  perception	  may	  of	  course	  have	   much	   to	   do	   with	   switching	   trends	   in	   global	   capital	   flows	   and	   the	   new	  awareness	   of	   states	   which	   were	   formerly	   the	   home	   to	   private	   investors,	   that	  under	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   BITs,	   their	   own	   regulatory	   powers	   in	   respect	   of	   local	  consumers	   or	   environment	   are	   now	   seriously	   curtailed	   in	   favor	   of	   incoming	  foreign	  capital5.	  	  2.	   But	   it	   is	   clearly	   also	   the	   result	   of	   changing	   expectations	   within	   the	  international	  community	  as	  to	  the	  content	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  their	  role	  in	  the	  international	  legal	  order.	  The	  first	  bilateral	  BIT	  between	  Germany	  and	  Pakistan	  was	  negotiated	  in	  1959,	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  struggle	  for	  a	  new	  distribution	  in	  the	  world	  economy6.	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  collective	  social	  and	  economic	  rights	  were	  all	  but	  unformulated;	  public	  awareness	  of	  environmental	  issues	  very	  limited;	  claims	  of	  newly	  independent	  developing	  countries	  states	  to	  control	   their	   natural	   resources	   as	   yet	   unarticulated;	   the	   status	   of	   indigenous	  peoples	  distinct	   from	  the	  sovereign	  state	  as	  yet	  equally	  unchartered.	  That	  BITs	  multiplied	  and	  prospered	  along	   identical	   lines	  even	  after	   the	  hotly	  disputed	  oil	  and	   gas	   arbitrations	   of	   the	   60s,	   the	   emerging	   foundations	   of	   a	   new	   economic	  order	   in	   the	   70s,	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   Washington	   consensus	   in	   the	   90s,	   bearts	  withness	  both	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  lending	  policy,	  and	   to	   the	   pull	   of	   the	   downward	   regulatory	   spiral	   among	   developing	   states	   in	  pursuit	  of	  private	  foreign	  capital7.	   
                                                5	  M	   Sornarajah,	  The	   International	  Law	  on	  Foreign	   Investment	   (Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   3rd	  edn	   2010),	   emphasising	   the	   contemporary	   reversal	   under	   which	   Western	   states,	   previously	  exporters	  of	  capital	  and	  now	  the	  largest	  recipients	  of	  foreign	  investment,	  are	  becoming	  wary	  of	  the	   legal	   arguments	   and	   tools	   developed	  within	   20th	   century	   investment	   law	   (see	   p	   25,	   citing	  examples	   of	   contestation,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   arbitration	   or	   multilateral	   dispute	   resolution,	   by	  Canada	   and	   the	  United	   States,	   of	   facets	   of	   foreign	   investment	   regimes	  which	   they	   had	   initially	  crafted,	  particularly	  those	  which	  hamper	  the	  regulatory	  power	  of	  the	  host	  state).  	  
6	  General	   Assembly	   resolution	   1803	   (XVII)	   1962	  declares	   "The	   right	   of	   peoples	   and	   nations	   to	  
permanent	  sovereignty	  over	  their	  natural	  wealth	  and	  resources	  must	  be	  exercised	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  
their	  national	  development	  and	  of	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  State	  concerned."…"Violation	  of	   the	   rights	   of	   peoples	   and	   nations	   to	   sovereignty	   over	   their	   natural	  wealth	   and	   resources	   is	  contrary	   to	   the	   spirit	   and	   principles	   of	   the	   Charter	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   hinders	   the	  development	   of	   international	   cooperation	   and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   peace."	   Then	   in	   1966	  permanent	   sovereignty	  over	  natural	   resources	  became	  a	   general	  principle	  of	   international	   law	  when	  it	  was	  included	  in	  common	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  and	  the	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights.	  	  
7 See Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth Simmons. 2004. Competing for Capital: The 
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3.	  While	   the	   economic	   justification	   for	  weighting	   the	   design	   of	   bilateral	  investment	  regimes	  so	  as	  to	  restrict	  the	  regulatory	  powers	  of	  the	  host	  state	  was	  found	  in	  the	  desirability	  of	   fostering	  foreign	  direct	   investment	  through	  a	  stable	  environment,	   the	  robust	  protection	  provided	  to	  contract	  and	  property	  rights	  of	  the	  private	  investor	  was	  also	  generally	  touted	  as	  contributing	  significantly	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  host	  state.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  investment	  regime	  was	  initially	  perceived	   to	   accommodate	  a	  human	   rights	   component,	   in	   that	   it	  was	   linked	   to	  the	  supposed	  impotence	  of	  the	  private	  investor	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  unbridled	  power	  of	  the	   local	   sovereign. The	   substantive	   guarantees provided	   for	   incoming	   capital	  flows	  thus	  tellingly	  comprise	  a	  commitment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  host	  country	  both	  to	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	   fair	   and	   equitable	   treatment	   of	   the	   investor,	   who	  thereby	  secures	  a	  first-­‐mover	  advantage	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  capital	  in	  which	   the	   host	   is	   inevitably	   engaged.	   A	   compulsory	   arbitration	  mechanism,	  which	   the	   foreign	   investor	   has	   the	   sole	   right	   to	   trigger,	   thereafter	   ensures	   the	  intangibility	  of	  the	  contractual	  acquis.	  Host	  state	  consent,	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  entire	   regime,	   legitimates	   any	   perceived	   infringement	   of	   sovereignty,	   and,	  typically,	   there	   is	   no	   further	   reference	   to	   human	   rights.	   Nor	   is	   any	   specific	  procedure	   envisaged	  whereby	   communities	   or	   individuals	  whose	   interests	   are	  unaligned	  on	  those	  of	  the	  host	  state	  may	  be	  heard.	  4.	   Contemporary	   critique	   of	   the	   international	   investment	   regime	   takes	  several	  forms.	  The	  most	  overtly	  political,	  which	  has	  led	  several	  host	  countries	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  ICSID	  framework,	  focuses	  on	  the	  perceived	  structural	  bias	  of	  the	   whole	   regime,	   famously	   described	   by	   José	   Alvarez	   as	   a	   special	   interest	  human	   rights	   regime	   for	   investors 8 .	   Thus,	   BITS,	   or	   their	   accompanying	  contractual	   arrangements	   between	   host	   government	   and	   private	   investor9 ,	  result	   in	   a	   confiscation	  of	   local	   regulatory	   sovereignty,	   in	   fields	   as	   sensitive	   as	  taxation,	   public	   health	   and	   environment;	   if	   public	   interest	   is	   persistently	   side-­‐lined,	   it	   is	   no	   doubt	   because	   the	   negotiation	   of	   such	   treaties	   and	   the	  accompanying	   contractual	   regime	   takes	   place	   outside	   the	   public	   sphere10 .	  
                                                                                                                                      
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties: 1960-2000. 
 8	  Jose	  Alvarez,	  “Critical	  Theory	  and	  the	  North	  American	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement’s	  Chapter	  Eleven”	  (1997)	  28	  University	  of	  Miami	  Inter-­‐American	  Law	  Review	  303,	  p.308.	  	  9	  BITs	  are	  international	  treaties	  which	  create	  obligations	  for	  the	  state	  parties	  (in	  fact,	  essentially,	  for	   the	   host,	   capital-­‐importing,	   state)	   under	   international	   law.	   They	   are	   inseparable	   from	   the	  development	   of	   a	   doctrine	   of	   international	   state	   contracts	   or	   Host	   Government	   Agreements	  (HGAs),	  which	  are	  concluded	  directly	  between	  private	  investors	  and	  foreign	  governments.	  While	  these	  are	  “private”	  international	  contracts	  (domestic	  public	  law	  providing	  the	  conditions	  of	  state	  party’s	   consent)	   and	   not	   international	   treaties,	   public	   international	   law	   may	   nevertheless	   be	  chosen	   by	   the	   parties	   as	   governing	   law.	   This	   blurring	   of	   categories	   tends	   to	   work	   to	   the	  advantage	  of	  the	  private	  party	  (see	  H.	  Muir	  Watt,	  “Private	  International	  law	  Beyond	  the	  Schism”	  
(2011) 2(3) Transnational Legal Theory 347–427).	  	  
10 This “participation deficit” critique is thus formulated by Marc Jacob (op cit, sub § 2.4.2)“(A)	  
potential	  concern	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  despite	  the	  ultimately	  far-­‐reaching	  impact	  of	  major	  international	  
investments	  (e.g.	  power	  plants,	  water	  and	  sewage	  infrastructure,	  landfills,	  mining	  pits	  etc.),	  the	  BITs	  
providing	  the	  basic	  legal	  framework	  for	  such	  large-­‐scale	  projects	  have	  traditionally	  been	  negotiated	  
and	   concluded	   outside	   the	   public	   sphere.	   This	   acute	   participation	   deficit	   of	   concerned	   sectors	   of	  
society	   and	   NGOs	   is	   of	   course	   not	   uncommon	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   international	   treaties.	   One	   curt	  
 4 
Moreover,	  while	  foreign	  capital	  input	  is	  clearly	  a	  condition	  of	  access	  to	  economic	  growth	   for	   the	   most	   impoverished	   countries,	   the	   real	   contribution	   of	   foreign	  direct	   investment	   as	   it	   is	   currently	   designed	   is	   called	   into	   question,	   since	  incoming	   capital	   has	   no	   countervailing	   duties,	   and	   profits	   from	   delocalized	  production	   rarely	   flow	   back	   into	   the	   local	   economy.	   Worse,	   contracts	   for	   the	  extraction	  of	  natural	  resources	  such	  as	  oil	  and	  gas	  concessions	  may	  come	  with	  an	  infernal	   cycle	   of	   indebtedness	   that	   makes	   the	   host	   country	   an	   easy	   prey	   for	  vulture	   funds11;	   land-­‐grabbing	   or	   various	   short-­‐sighted	   policy	   choices	   dictated	  by	   the	   interests	   of	   international	   agro-­‐industry	   may	   impact	   on	   access	   to	   food.	  Ethical	   and	   social	   concerns	   highlight	   repeated	   abuses	   by	   foreign	  multinational	  investors,	   whether	   in	   the	   form	   of	   violence,	   exploitation	   or	   discrimination	   in	  respect	   of	   the	   local	  workforce.	   Environmentalists	   point	   in	   turn	   to	   the	  negative	  externalities	   generated	   locally	   by	   intensive	   industrial	   activities,	   in	   the	   form	   of	  pollution	   and	   other	   durable	   ecological	   harm,	   while	   local	   cultural	   or	   religious	  heritage	  may	  not	  come	  out	  unscathed.	   5.	  Other	   complaints	   target	   the	   arbitration	   regime	  more	   specifically,	   and	  denounce	   once	   again	   systemic	   investor-­‐bias.	   Part	   of	   the	   problem	   here	  may	   be	  procedural.	   Attention	   is	   drawn	   to	   arbitration’s	   lack	   of	   transparency;	   the	  recruitment	   processes	   are	   seen	   to	   operate	   by	   means	   of	   old-­‐boy	   networks,	   or	  through	   a	  market	   for	   complicit	   arbitrators.	  Moreover,	   the	   compulsory	   offer	   of	  arbitration	  by	  the	  host	  state,	  and	  the	  correlative	  privilege	  of	  the	  private	  investor	  to	  trigger	  the	  arbitration	  process,	  exemplifies	  a	  lack	  of	  mutuality.	  More	  radically,	  beyond	   the	   unfairness	   of	   process,	   challenges	   to	   investment	   arbitration	  stigmatize	   a	   privatized	   regime	   which	   entrusts	   law-­‐making	   on	   highly	   sensitive	  issues	  of	  public	  interest	  to	  expert	  panels	  devoid	  of	  any	  democratic	  legitimacy.	  In	  this	   respect,	   the	   contractual	   nature	   of	   arbitration	   makes	   it	   ill-­‐equipped	   to	  consider	  the	  effects	  of	  any	  negative	  externalities	  generated	  by	  investment-­‐linked	  activities	   for	   third	   parties.	   Much	   thought	   is	   currently	   given	   to	   improving	   the	  arbitration	  process,	  making	  it	  more	  transparent	  and	  less	  unpredictable.	  Case-­‐law	  might	  then	  develop	  informally,	  providing	  better	  consistency	  and	  less	  suspicion	  of	  arbitrariness,	  while	  the	  interests	  of	  affected	  individuals	  or	  communities	  outside	  the	   arbitration	   process	   may	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   by	   allowing	   third	   party	  
                                                                                                                                      
answer	   to	   this	   is	   that	   the	   citizens’	   consent	   can	   be	   indirectly	   derived	   from	   their	   respective	  
governments’	   participation	   in	   the	   treaty-­‐making	   process.	   This	   places	   a	   potentially	   unwarranted	  
degree	   of	   faith	   in	   national	   governments’	   ambitions	   to	   promote	   and	   protect	   human	   rights,	   which	  
some	   states	   will	   unhesitatingly	   subordinate	   to	   economic	   development.	   Another	   reply	   furtively	  
questions	   the	  wisdom	  of	   even	   having	   the	   public	   participate	   in	   all	   aspects	   of	  what	   is	   essentially	   a	  
highly	   specialised	   technocratic	   exercise…	   (I)t	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   public	   awareness	   and	  
participation,	  and	  therefore	  ultimately	  democracy	  and	  legitimacy,	  have	  traditionally	  been	  sidelined	  
in	  erecting	  the	  fundamental	  tenets	  of	  the	  current	  investment	  regime”.	   





interventions,	   class	   actions	   or	   amicus	   briefs.	   To	  what	   extent	   this	   is	   enough	   to	  reverse	   the	   perceived	   investor-­‐bias	   is	   questionable,	   however.	   Arbitration,	   like	  the	  entire	  investment	  regime,	  is	  consent-­‐based.	  When	  consent	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  unequal	  economic	  system,	   the	  answer	  can	  only	   lie	   in	   the	   transformation	  of	   the	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  investment	  regime.	  	  	  	  
 6.	   Whether	   such	   concerns	   touch	   upon	   the	   substantive	   content	   of	   the	  investment	   treaties	   or	   the	   specific	   dispute	   resolution	   mechanism	   designed	   to	  enforce	   the	   commitments	   of	   the	   host	   state,	   they	   are	   frequently	   couched	   in	  human	   rights	   language.	   While	   BITs	   sought	   to	   safeguard	   investor	   interests	   by	  means	   of	   a	   liberal	   private	   law	   framework	   of	   individual	   property	   rights,	   the	  current	   evolution	   breaks	   away	   from	   this	   framework	   and	   attempts	   to	   open	   the	  investment	   regime	   to	   collective	   social	   and	   economic	   rights,	   such	   as	   access	   to	  food	  or	  water,	  or	  so-­‐called	  “third	  generation”	  rights	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  a	  clean	  environment.	  Since	   the	  bilateral	   treaties	  are	  devoid	  of	  any	  explicit	   reference	   to	  human	   rights	   (whatever	   the	   generation),	   this	   new	   challenge	   to	   the	   investment	  regime	  relies	  on	  external	  sources,	  of	  which	  the	  relevance	  and	  potential	  primacy	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  readily	  justified	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  (state)	  consent,	  and	  may	  be	   considered	  by	  many	   investment	   arbitrators	   as	   lying	  beyond	   the	   confines	   of	  their	   jurisdiction.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   current	   confrontation	   between	   the	  international	  investment	  regime	  and	  the	  values	  embodied	  in	  human	  rights	  bears	  potentially	   wider	   theoretical	   implications	   for	   the	   structure	   and	   content	   of	   the	  international	  legal	  order.	  	  	  7.	  The	  collision	  between	  the	  two	  regimes	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	   of	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   international	   legal	   order12 .	   Moreover,	  through	  the	  conjunction	  of	  its	  largely	  contractual	  or	  private	  law	  components	  and	  its	   far-­‐reaching	  social,	  economic	  and	  ecological	  consequences,	   the	   international	  investment	  field	  is	  seen	  to	  illustrate	  the	  epistemological	  blurring	  which	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  hallmark	  of	  global	  law,	  straddling	  the	  liberal	  divides	  between	  national	  and	  international	  law,	  or	  public	  and	  private	  spheres. The	  debate	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  real	  or	  apparent	  antinomies	  between	  the	  human	  rights	  and	   the	   investment	  regime,	   and	   proposals	   for	   improvements	   have	   been	  made	   accordingly	   -­‐	   either	  through	  the	  resources	  of	  interpretation	  by	  arbitrators,	  or	  more	  radically	  through	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  general	  content	  of	  BITs.	  	  Much	  thought	  has	  been	  given	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  conflicting	  norms	  or	  values	  might	  be	  reconciled,	  and	  the	  shattered	  unity	   of	   international	   law	   recovered13.	   	   Is	   there	   not	   room	   for	   human	   rights	  before	   the	   arbitrator?	   Is	   the	   investment	   regime	   not	   subordinated	   to	   general	  international	   law?	   	   Might	   the	   interests	   of	   affected	   communities	   not	   be	  represented	  through	  amicus	  briefs,	  supported	  by	  ONGs?	  	  	  8.	   All	   these	   paths	   are	   promising	   and	   have	   already	   been	   thoroughly	  mapped.	   But	   there	   may	   be	   more. This	   paper	   will	   attempt	   to	   pursue	   the	  
                                                
12 On fragmentation and the problems attendant on the multiplication of specialized regimes, to the 
detriment of wider values, see Marty Koskiennemi, The	   Politics	   of	   International	   Law	   (Hart	  Publishing,	  2011),	  spec.	  p.359.	  	  
13 See James Fry,	  James Fry,	  “International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  In	  Investment	  Arbitration:	  Evidence	  Of	  International	  Law’s	  Unity”,	  18	  Duke	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  &	  International	  Law	  77	  (2008).	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discussion	  by	  linking	  it	  up	  to	  various	  contemporary	  efforts	  to	  theorize	  both	  the	  components	  of	  global	  disorder	  and	  the	  processes	  of	  transformative	  legal	  change	  in	  the	  global	  arena.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  therefore,	  firstly,	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  the	   wider	   analytical	   frameworks	   through	   which	   to	   understand	   the	   conflicts	  between	   autonomous	   regimes,	   with	   a	   view	   to	   imagining	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  human	  rights	  might	   impact	  upon	  the	   investment	  regime.	   In	   this	  respect,	  recent	  scholarship	  using	  systems	  theory	  and	  institutional	  analysis	  to	  conceptualize	  legal	  change	   tends	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   most	   promising	   path	   by	   which	   to	   secure	   an	  essential	   rebalancing	   of	   the	   investment	   regime	  without	   ungluing	   the	   legal	   and	  economic	   system	   through	   which	   equitable	   development	   might	   be	   achieved,	   is	  through	   the	   instauration	   of	   “spaces	   of	   contestation”	   -­‐	   or,	   in	   a	   different	  terminology,	  sites	  of	  “learning	  pressure”	  -­‐	  outside	  the	  investment	  regime	  and	  its	  arbitral	  forum.	  	  Once	  this	  conceptual	  framework	  in	  place,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  map	  the	  route	   by	   which,	   in	   more	   concrete	   terms,	   the	   contestation	   of	   the	   investment	  regime	  might	  exit	  the	  sole	  arbitral	  forum	  and	  relocate	  to	  more	  propitious	  sites.	  	  	  	  	  	  
I.	   –	  The	  resources	  of	   regime-­‐collision	   (or	  how	   institutional	   change	  within	  
the	  contested	  investment	  regime	  might	  take	  place	  through	  contestation).	  	  
	   9.	   Absent	   the	   reassuring	   vision	   of	   a	   hierarchical,	   unitary	   international	  legal	   order	   built	   upon	   customary	   or	   universally	   accepted	   foundational	   norms	  administered	   by	   the	   International	   Court	   of	   Justice	   as	   a	   world	   court,	   many	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  understand	  what	  role	  law	  has	  to	  play	  and	  what	  form	  it	  takes	  beyond,	  above	  or	  across	  the	  sovereign	  nation-­‐state.	  The	  difficulty	  of	  such	  an	   exercise	   owes	   much	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   multiple	   specialized	   or	   regional	  supra-­‐national	   law-­‐making	   bodies	   and	   courts,	   which	   now	   govern	   a	   significant	  part	  of	  world	  trade	  and	  finance;	  to	  the	  economic	  significance	  of	  non-­‐state	  profit	  and	   non-­‐profit	   actors	   wielding	   informal	   power	   at	   a	   global	   level;	   and	   to	   the	  growth	   of	   a	   parallel,	   semi-­‐private	   system	   of	   investment	   arbitration	   with	   no	  clearly	   defined	   relationship	   with	   parallel	   public	   interest	   regimes.	   While	   some	  still	   place	   faith	   in	   the	   unity	   of	   customary	   international	   law,	   project	   all-­‐encompassing	   constitutional	   orders14,	   or	   turn	   to	   the	   conflict	   of	   laws	   for	   the	  design	   of	   a	   meta-­‐signpost	   rule 15 ,	   others	   point	   more	   realistically	   to	   the	  fragmentation	  in	  multiple	  colliding	  expert	  regimes,	  of	  which	  human	  rights	  on	  the	  one	   hand,	   and	   world	   trade	   and	   investment	   on	   the	   other,	   are	   excellent	  examples16.	   But	   beyond	   a	   form	   of	   pragmatism17,	   efforts	   to	   conceptualize	   this	  
                                                14	  See	  the	  various	  contributions	  to	  J	  Dunod	  and	  J	  Trachtman	  (eds),	  Ruling	  the	  World?	  
Constitutionalism,	  International	  law	  and	  Global	  Governance	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009).	  	  	  15	  C	  Joerges,	  ‘The	  Idea	  of	  a	  Three-­‐Dimensional	  Conflicts	  Law	  as	  Constitutional	  Form’	  in	  Joerges	  and	  Petersmann	  (eds),	  Constitutionalism,	  Multilevel	  Trade	  Governance	  and	  International	  Economic	  
Law	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2011)	  413;	  	  
 16	  Martty	  Koskiennemi,	  op	  cit,	  whose	  point	  is	  that	  fragmented	  specialization	  also	  means	  depolitization	  :	  ‘What	  we	  see	  now	  is	  an	  international	  realm	  where	  law	  is	  everywhere—the	  law	  of	  this	  or	  that	  regime—but	  no	  politics	  at	  all	  ...’	  p.359).	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global	  disorder	  are	  few	  and	  far	  between.	  	  10.	   Potentially,	   an	   investment	   arbitration	   may	   well	   clash	   violently,	   in	  terms	   of	   outcomes	   and	   values,	   with	   a	   competing	   human	   rights	   regime.	   In	   the	  Belize	   case	   discussed	   below,	   an	   indigenous	   people	   claimed	   title	   to	   land	  which	  has	   been	   conceded	   by	   the	   national	   government	   to	   a	   foreign	   investor.	   One	   can	  easily	  imagine	  a	  successful	  arbitration	  claim	  brought	  against	  the	  host	  state	  by	  an	  investor	   whose	   (more	   formal)	   property	   rights	   under	   the	   concession	   are	  adversely	  affected	  by	  a	  ruling	  favorable	  to	  the	  native	  occupants.	   In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  two	  regimes	  makes	  for	  a	  destructive	  clash.	  When	  the	  human	  rights	  regime,	  administered	  by	  the	  public	  court	  system,	  collides	  with	  investment	  arbitration	  bypassing	  domestic	   fora	   (with	   the	  host	   state	   trapped	  here	  between	  the	   hammer	   and	   the	   anvil18),	   the	   resulting	   conflict	   is	   beyond	   the	   sway	   of	   the	  usual	  tools	  of	  coordination	  between	  competing	  norms,	  such	  as	  the	  quest	   for	  an	  overlapping	   consensus,	   or	   the	   search	   for	   the	   relevance	   of	   a	   different	   regime	  (though	   such	   an	   avenue	  must	   undoubtedly	   be	   encouraged).	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   not	   a	  mere	   conflict	   of	   laws,	   to	   be	   arbitrated	   in	   favor	   of	   one	   or	   the	   other	   by	   the	  competent	   forum.	   It	   involves	  a	  collision	  between	  regimes	  as	  a	  whole,	  complete	  with	   their	   foundational	   values	   or	   biases,	   their	   courts	   or	   dispute	   resolution	  processes,	  their	  modes	  of	  enforcement	  or	  coercion.	  	  11.	  The	  resulting	  disorder	  could	  look	  much	  like	  the	  landscape	  emerging	  in	  a	  case	  such	  as	  the	  notorious	  Chevron	  saga19,	  involving	  a	  head-­‐on	  clash	  between	  autonomous	  systems	  constituted	  by	  the	  Ecuadorian	  courts,	  the	  US	  courts	  and	  an	  arbitration	   panel	   under	   the	   aegis	   of	   the	   Permanent	   Court	   of	   arbitration	   at	   the	  Hague.	   A	   judgment	   in	   Ecuador	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   claims	   of	   indigenous	   forest-­‐dwellers	  of	  the	  Amazon	  against	  Shell	  for	  ecological	  damage,	  has	  led	  to	  a	  deadlock,	  
                                                                                                                                      17	  Benoit	  Frydmann,	  "Approche	  pragmatique	  du	  droit	  global",	  seminar	  Sciences	  po	  9	  Feb.	  2012,	  Publication	  forthcoming,	  PILAGG	  yearbook	  2012. 	  18	  As	  shown	  below,	  any	  compensation	  for	  expropriation	  awarded	  to	  the	  private	  investor	  against	  the	  host	  government	  will	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  local	  population,	  since	  it	  is	  implies	  using	  taxes	  or	  development	   aid	   to	   make	   the	   payment.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   doubtful	   that	   the	   terms	   of	   any	   such	  concession,	   obtained	   within	   a	   wider	   context	   of	   fierce	   competition	   for	   capital,	   would	   be	  sufficiently	  favorable	  to	  cover	  (even	  the	  equitable)	  the	  costs.	  
19 An	   arbitrator	   acting	   under	   the	   aegis	   of	   the	   Permanent	   Court	   of	   Arbitration	   at	   the	   Hague	  ordered	   provisional	   measures	   to	   prevent	   the	   enforcement	   of	   the	   judgment	   of	   Ecuador,	   the	  sovereign	  party,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   its	  award	  of	  damages	   to	   indigenous	  peoples	  dwelling	  at	   the	  site	   of	   the	   oil	   and	   gas	   extraction	   interfered	   with	   the	   protection	   of	   a	   private	   property	   right	  guaranteed	   under	   the	   bilateral	   agreement.	   See	   Permanent	   Court	   of	   Arbitration	   at	   the	   Hague,	  Interim	   Award	   of	   9	   February	   2011.	   On	   25	   January	   2012,	   the	   same	   tribunal	   asserted	   its	  jurisdiction	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  company’s	  liability	  under	  an	  investment	  treaty.	  Then	  a	  global	  anti-­‐suit	  injunction was	  ordered	  in	  favour	  of	  Chevron,	  only	  to	  be	  lifted	  a	  year	  later	  (see	  District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  Orders	  of	  6	  February	  and	  7	  April	  2011;	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Second	  Circuit,	  Judgment	  of	  17	  March	  2011).	  On	  26	  January	  2012,	  Judge	  Gerard	  Lynch	  of	  the	  US	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Second	  Circuit	  said	  that	  such	  an	  injunction	  could	  only	  be	  sought	  ‘defensively,	   in	   response	   to	   an	   attempted	   enforcement’.	   In	   the	   present	   case,	   the	   Ecuadorean	  plaintiffs	   ‘made	   no	   effort	   to	   enforce	   their	   judgment	   in	   New	   York	   (nor	   indeed,	   in	   any	   other	  jurisdiction)’.	  The	  Ecuadorian	  judgment	  was	  handed	  down	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Sucumbíos,	  Lago	  Agrio,	  Ecuador,	  on	  14	  February	  2011.	  On	  the	  whole	  saga,	  see	  H	  Muir	  Watt,	  (2011)	  Rev	  crit	  DIP	  339.	  The	  arbitration	   under	   the	   BIT	   here	  was	   a	   United	  Nations	   Commission	   on	   International	   Trade	   Law	  (UNCITRAL)	  arbitration.  
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involving	   the	   wielding	   of	   judicial	   retaliatory	   weapons	   such	   as	   global	   anti-­‐suit	  injunctions,	  while	  international	  arbitrators	  give	  orders	  which	  purport	  to	  bind	  the	  Ecuadorian	  judiciary.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  last	  word	  belongs	  to	  the	  party	  with	  the	  most	   extra-­‐judicial	   leverage.	   Ecuador	   has	  denounced	   its	   participation	   in	   ICSID.	  The	   glue	   which	   held	   the	   whole	   system	   together	   has	   dissolved.	   Whatever	   the	  wrongs	  either	   in	  a	   specific	   case	  or	   in	   the	  bias	  of	   the	  whole	   investment	   regime,	  this	   also	   means	   that	   unless	   it	   has	   leverage	   to	   renegotiate	   its	   own	   BITs,	   the	  recalcitrant	   state	   is	   cut	   off	   from	   external	   supplies	   of	   capital.	   Is	   there,	   then,	   no	  other	   answer	   than	   to	   accept	   that	   “true	   conflicts”	   are	   insoluble	   in	   a	   context	   of	  pluralism	  of	   systems,	   each	  with	   its	   own	   values,	   fora	   and	   tools?	   	   A	   key	  may	   be	  found	  in	  three	  strands	  of	  contemporary	  scholarship	  which,	  combined,	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  most	  promising	  way	  in	  which	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  deadlock	  while	   sewing	   transformative	   seeds	   would	   be,	   perhaps	   counter-­‐intuitively,	   to	  secure	  sites	  of	  productive	  contestation	  at	  the	  interface	  of	  the	  two	  regimes.	  	  12.	  1.	  -­‐Thus,	  firstly,	  Colin	  Scott	  and	  Robert	  Wai	  have	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  private	  law	  contestation	  before	  domestic	  courts	  may	  operate	  to	  effect	  a	  “migration”	   of	   human	   rights	   norms	   to	   new	   sites20.	   The	   starting	   point	   is	   the	  conviction	   that	   “the	   current	   transnational	   order	   involves	   more	   interaction	  
between	  and	  among	  systems	  in	  different	  legal	  venues	  than	  some	  systems	  theories	  of	  
global	   networks	   imagine”.	   They	   then	   explore	   how	   “governance	   strategies	   that	  
would	   promote	   the	   objectives	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   norms	   can	   be	  
developed	   through	   the	   migration	   of	   these	   norms	   into	   legal	   interpretation	   and	  
application	  in	  venues	  of	  transnational	  private	  litigation	  in	  domestic	  courts”.	  In	  this	  latter	  context,	  the	  seek	  to	  show	  that	  “human	  rights	  law	  provides	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  
introduction	   and	   consideration	   of	   alternative	   policy	   considerations	   and	   value-­‐
laden	  premises	  …	  that	  help	  channel	  and	  structure	  reasoning	  within	  law”.	  	  13.	  	  	   The	  two	  important	  insights	  of	  this	  project	  are,	  in	  the	  one	  hand	  that,	  when	  wielded	  in	  a	  different	  forum	  –	  here,	  before	  domestic	  courts,	  -­‐	  international	  human	  rights	  norms	  may	  help	  to	  bring	  out	  the	   internal	  conflicts	   that	  have	  been	  obscured	  within	  the	  importing	  –	  here	  the	  domestic	  –	  system.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  through	  the	   bringing	   such	   conflicts	   to	   the	   surface	   that	   the	   intersystemic	   “migration”	   of	  human	  rights	  norms	   takes	  place.	   Secondly,	  we	  are	  urged	   to	   consider	  a	   “rough”	  version	  of	  transnational	  law,	  far	  from	  the	  smooth	  picture	  of	  custom,	  community	  and	  consensus	  which	  tends	  to	  characterize	  narratives	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  lex	  
mercatoria21.	  This	  alternative	  account	  sees	  the	  global	  legal	  order	  as	  fraught	  with	  conflict	  through	  which	  plural	  competing	  systems	  interconnect	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  law.	  They	  are	  seen	  to	  evolve	  through	  mutual	  interaction,	  operating	  through	  (often	  hidden)	  tensions	  within	  the	  importing	  system.	  	  	  These	  insights	  on	  the	  links	  between	   (private	   law)	   contestation	   and	   migration	   of	   legal	   norms	   lays	   the	  
                                                
20 Colin Scott and Robert Wai, “Regulating Corporate Conduct	  through	  the	  Migration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Norms:	  The	  Potential	  Contribution	  of	  Transnational	  Private'	  Litigation”,	  in	  Colin	  Scott	  (ed),	  as	  Tort:	  Comparative	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Development	  of	  Transnational	  Human	  Rights	  Litigation,	  Oxford,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2001,	  p.	  287.	  The	  following	  excerpts	  are	  from	  pp.	  289	  s. 	  
21 Robert Wai, ‘The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law’ (2008) 71 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 107  
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groundwork	   for	   considering	   the	   complex	   interdependencies	   between	   human	  agency,	  institutions	  and	  wider	  social	  systems	  (which	  may	  well	  be	  wider	  than	  the	  nation-­‐state)	  in	  bringing	  about	  legal	  change. 14.	   2.-­‐	   In	   Katarina	   Pistor’s	   account 22 ,	   mutual	   interactions	   between	  institutions	  and	  systems	  are	  depicted	  through	  what	  she	  describes	  as	  a	  “weaving	  metaphor”:	   social	   systems	   are	   represented	   as	   open,	   institutions	   may	   have	  interfaces	  with	  multiple	  systems,	  and	  interdependencies	  work	  both	  ways23.	  Such	  interdependencies	  suppose	  however	  a	  common	  “glue”,	  which	  takes	  the	   form	  of	  shared	  sources	  of	  legitimacy.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  institutional	  regimes	  “become	  
exclusive	  legal	  orders	  for	  particularized	  interests,	  they	  may	  erode	  common	  sources	  
of	   legitimacy	   on	   which	   a	   broader	   legal	   system	   rests.	   Such	   a	   system,	   however,	   is	  
needed	   to	   provide	   a	   space	   for	   contesting	   priorities	   among	   competing	   regimes”. 
Applied to the investment regime, which look much like “	  an	  exclusive	   legal	  order	  for	  particularized	  interests”	   in	  this	  description,	  this	  analysis	  requires	   locating	  a	  space	   in	  which	   the	  regime	  can	  be	  contested	  and	  changed	   in	   the	   light	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  15.	   Indeed,	   two	   case-­‐studies	   are	   proposed	   to	   illustrate	   the	   thesis24	  that	  
“access	   to	   a	   forum	   for	   resolving	   disputes	   –	   whether	   a	   tribunal,	   committee	   or	   a	  
court	  –	  creates	  an	  open	  space	  for	  contestation	  where	  the	   interpretation	  of	  norms	  
and	   their	  application	   to	  different	   fact	  patterns	   can	  be	   interpreted,	  amended,	  and	  
changed	  over	  time”.	  When	  the	  space	  for	  contestation	  is	  beyond	  the	  system	  (if	  the	  system	   is	   the	   nation-­‐state,	   the	   opened	   space	   may	   be	   transnational	   or	  supranational),	   contested	   institutions	  may	   ultimately	   impact	   upon	   it,	   inducing	  legal	  change.	  The	  strain	  put	  upon	  the	  wider	  system	  by	  institutional	  contestation	  depends	  upon	  whether	   such	   contestation	   challenges	   the	   system’s	  own	   legality.	  
“As	   long	  as	   institutional	  regimes	  endorse	  a	  system’s	  common	  source	  of	   legitimacy	  
for	   determining	   their	   relation	   to	   other	   institutional	   regimes,	   even	   when	   this	  
conflicts	  with	  their	  own	  preferences,	  they	  remain	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  that	  system.	  If	  
and	   when	   this	   common	   source	   of	   legitimacy	   is	   openly	   challenged,	   the	   relation	  
becomes	   more	   tenuous;	   and	   when	   they	   claim	   that	   their	   source	   of	   legitimacy	   is	  
                                                22	  Katharina	  Pistor	  (2011)	  “Contesting	  Property	  Rights:	  Towards	  an	  Integrated	  Theory	  of	  Institutional	  and	  System	  Change,”	  Global	  Jurist:	  Vol.	  11:	  Iss.	  2	  (Frontiers),	  Article	  6.	  	  Available	  at	  http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol11/iss2/art6.	  This	  study	  departs	  from	  recent	  trends	  in	  literatures 
on institutions and institutional change by	  focusing	  on	  the	  complex	  interdependencies	  between	  systems	  and	  institutions.	   
23	  In	   this	   framework,	   “a	   system	   comprises	   multiple	   institutions	   or	   institutional	   regimes,	   but	   not	  
necessarily	   in	  a	  hierarchical	   fashion.	   Instead,	   an	   institutional	   regime	   can	  develop	  outside	  a	  given	  
system	  and	  can	  interface	  with	  more	  than	  one.	  It	  can	  have	  rule	  makers	  and	  rule	  takers	  different	  from	  
other	   institutional	  regimes,	  and	   from	  those	   found	   in	   the	  systems	  they	  seek	  to	  affect”.	   Her	   point	   is	  that	   the	  relationship	  between	  systems	  and	   institutions	  may	  be	   two-­‐way,	  since	   institutions	  may	  impact	   in	   turn	  upon	   systems,	  which	   are	   open	   (and	  not	   closed	   as	   in	   accounts	  which	   often	   take	  place	  within	  the	  nation-­‐state).	  Like	  Scott	  and	  Wai,	  she	  also	  emphases	  the	  role	  of	  human	  agency	  within	  institutions,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  contestation.	  
24 Advanced	  in	  historical	  institutionalism	  by	  Wolfgang	  Streeck	  &	  Kathleen	  Thelen	  (Introduction:	  Institutional	  Change	  in	  Advanced	  Political	  Economies)	  In	  Beyond	  Continuity:	  Institutional	  Change	  
in	  Advanced	  Political	  Economies,	  edited	  by	  W.	  Streeck	  and	  K.	  Thelen,	  2005,	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	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superior	   to	   that	   of	   legality,	   frictions	   occur	   that	  may	  weaken	   the	   commonality	   of	  
legality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  legitimacy.	  Put	  differently,	  institutional	  regimes	  may	  weaken	  
the	   legitimacy	   of	   existing	   systems	   not	   only	   by	   contesting	   a	   particular	   form	   of	  
ordering	  (as	  suggested	  by	  Streeck	  and	  Thelen),	  but	  by	  offering	  alternative	  sources	  
of	  legitimacy”.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  system	  itself	  is	  threatened,	  with	  the	   disappearance	   of	   the	   consensus	   on	   its	   own	   parameters	   for	   balancing	  between	  competing	  institutions.	  	  16.	   A	   first	   example	   of	   contested	   property	   rights	   is	   used	   to	   show	   how	  contestation	   within	   a	   transnational	   institutional	   regime	   may	   endorse	   the	  legitimacy	   of	   the	   wider	   social	   system	   with	   which	   interfaces.	   The	   example	   is	  particularly	   apposite	   for	   our	   purposes,	   since	   it	   concerns	   a	   situation	   in	   which	  there	   is	  a	  clear	   tension	  between	  human	  rights	  and	   the	  requirements	  of	   foreign	  investment,	   at	   least	   as	   mediated	   through	   the	   governmental	   policy	   of	   the	   host	  state.	  Thus,	  the	  Belize	  case	  documents	  the	  struggle	  of	  the	  Maya	  people	  to	  retain	  lands	  which	  they	  had	  occupied	  historically	  (albeit	  without	  formal	  title),	  and	  from	  which	   the	   Belize	   government	   had	   sought	   to	   evict	   them,	   in	   order	   to	   provide	  concessions	   to	   foreign	   oil	   and	   gas	   investors.	   	   After	   appealing	   in	   vain	   to	   the	  national	  authorities,	  they	  took	  their	  case	  to	  the	  Inter	  American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (IACtHR),	  which	  recognized	  their	  property	  rights	  over	  the	  land	  under	  an	  “autonomous”	   definition	   of	   property 25 .	   Lack	   of	   reaction	   by	   the	   Belize	  government	  led	  ultimately	  to	  their	  title	  being	  endorsed	  by	  the	  national	  Supreme	  Court,	  which	  judged	  the	  ruling	  of	  the	  IACtHR	  to	  be	  “persuasive”,	  and	  integrated	  the	  outcome	  into	  its	  own	  findings	  on	  a	  distinct	  legal	  (constitutional)	  basis26.	  For	  the	   purposes	   of	   the	   proposed	   framework	   for	   analysis	   of	   legal	   change,	   the	  availability	   of	   a	   place	   of	   contestation	   for	   the	   institutional	   regime,	   outside	   the	  constitutional	  system,	  led	  in	  the	  end	  to	  change	  within.	  The	  intermediation	  of	  the	  domestic	  supreme	  court	  ensured	  the	  structural	  change.	  Thus,	  “the	  establishment	  
of	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanisms	  outside	  the	  sovereign’s	  reach	  was	  critical	  –	  and	  
so	  was	   the	   discovery	   of	   these	  mechanisms	   by	   international	  NGOs,	   law	   firms,	   and	  
other	  norm	  entrepreneurs”.	   17.	   So	   why	   does	   a	   second	   instance,	   taken	   this	   time	   from	   the	   field	   of	  NAFTA	  investment	  arbitration,	  herald	  such	  significantly	  different	  outcomes	  from	  the	  Belize	  case?	   It	  seems	  to	  show	  that	  while	  a	  contractual	   forum	  may	  similarly	  open	  a	   space	   for	  external	   contestation,	   legal	   change	  may	  not	  necessarily	  ensue	  when	   there	   is	   insufficient	   interface,	   and	   lack	   of	   legitimacy	   consensus,	  with	   the	  wider	   system.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   Metalclad	   case27,	   a	   NAFTA	   tribunal	   allowed	   an	  expropriation	   claim	   against	   the	   Mexican	   government	   when,	   despite	   approval	  
                                                25	  “Autonomous	  concepts”	  are	  a	  strategy	  used	  by	  supranational	  courts	  to	  ensure	  the	  primacy	  of	  	  given	  interpretation	  without	  appearing	  to	  affect	  domestic/national	  law	  directly.	  	  	  	  26	  Interestingly,	   this	  mode	   of	   interdependency	   is	   recognizable	   as	   an	   example	   of	   “relevance”	   in	  systems	   theory	   and	   has	   long	   been	   an	   essential	   tool	   for	  managing	   pluralism	   of	   legal	   orders	   in	  conflict	  of	   laws	  theory.	  On	  this	  point	  see	  “Private	  International	  Law	  Beyond	  the	  Schism”,	   	  p.400	  and	  the	  references	  cited	  FN	  257.	  	  27	  Metalclad	  Corporation	  v.	  United	  Mexican	  States,	  CASE	  No.	  ARB(AF)/97/1	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  (Additional	  Facility)	  of	  30	  August	  2000.	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given	  by	   this	  government,	  a	  municipality	  blocked	  a	  project	   led	  by	  an	  American	  company	  and	   its	  Mexican	  subsidiary	   to	  build	  a	  hazardous	  waste	   landfill.	   	  Here,	  federal	  distribution	  of	  power	  interfered	  with	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  investment	  agreement.	  As	  Kataraina	  Pistor	  points	  out,	  there	  was	  no	  involvement	  in	  this	  case	  of	  any	  domestic	  court	  in	  adjudicating	  whether	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  municipality	  did	  indeed	  amount	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  property	  rights.	  Since	  NAFTA	  gives	  investors	  the	  option	   to	   go	   directly	   to	   outside	   tribunals	   that	   have	   the	   power	   to	   grant	   them	  monetary	  relief	  against	  the	  host	  state,	  there	  is	  therefore	  no	  need	  to	  re-­‐litigate	  the	  dispute	   domestically.	  By	   the	   same	   token,	   there	  are	  no	  mechanisms	  by	  which	   the	  
normative	  conclusions	  of	  the	  case	  are	  transposed	  into	  national	  law	  or	  by	  which	  the	  
findings	  of	  the	  tribunal	  would	  be	  contested	  within	  the	  domestic	  legal	  system.	   It	   is	  doubtful	   therefore	  whether	  the	  condemnation	  of	   the	  Mexican	  government	  here	  will	  actually	  bring	  about	  any	  significant	  amendment	  within	  the	  domestic	  system.	  	  18.	   Thus,	   legal	   change	   will	   depend	   not	   only	   on	   the	   design	   of	   the	  contestable	  space,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  remedies	  available	  to	  the	  tribunal.	  The	  lack	  of	  structural	   remedies,	   indeed	   the	   absence	   of	   intermediation	   of	   any	   domestic	  tribunal,	  means	   that	  outsourcing	  dispute	   settlement	  and	  establishing	  a	  parallel	  transnational	  property	  rights	  regime	  may	  not	  work	  to	  bring	  change	  in	  domestic	  regimes.	  However,	  more	   significantly	   still,	   “the	  major	  reason	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  
they	   lack	   the	   legitimacy	   associated	  with	   the	   domestic	   legal	   system,	  which	  would	  
require	   contestation	   within	   that	   system”.	   Outsourcing	   of	   the	   dispute	   “	   ignores	  
legitimate	   competing	   interests	   within	   the	   domestic	   regime	   and	   thereby	   de-­‐
legitimizes	   the	   NAFTA	   property	   rights	   regime	   in	   its	   member	   states”.	   For	   the	  contestation	   to	   sew	   the	   seeds	  of	   change,	   it	  would	   therefore	  need	   to	   find	   space	  both	  outside	  and	  within	  the	  domestic	  legal	  system.	  	  19.	  3.	  -­‐	  Framed	  in	  different	  terms,	  Gunther	  Teubner	  provides	  an	  analytic	  of	   “regime	   collisions”	   in	   the	   global	   arena	  which	   reaches	   a	   similar	   conclusion28.	  Thus,	   clashes	   between	   autonomous	   specialized	   orders	   may	   in	   certain	  circumstances	  lead	  to	  their	  combination	  and	  an	  ensuing	  re-­‐foundation	  of	  a	  new	  regime.	   A	   remarkable	   example	   used	   to	   illustrate	   the	   deep	   transformation	   of	   a	  contested	   regime	   through	   collision,	   is	   the	   constitutionalization	   of	   corporate	  codes	  of	  conduct29.	  Flagging	  improved	  corporate	  governance,	  these	  private	  codes	  were	  initially	  designed	  far	  more	  to	  protect	  their	  corporate	  author	  from	  liability	  (in	  an	  attempt,	  directed	  essentially	  at	  the	  green	  consumer	  market,	  to	  show	  best	  efforts	  in	  compliance	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  environment),	  rather	  than	  to	  generate	   legally	  binding	  obligations	  which	  could	  be	   invoked	  by	   third	  parties	  harmed	  by	  transnational	  corporate	  activities.	  However,	  gaining	  gradual	  support	  from	  the	  outside,	  through	  parallel	  –	  though	  equally	  “soft”	  -­‐	  human	  rights	  norms	  developed	  in	  international	  fora,	  the	  corporate	  governance	  mechanism	  appears	  to	  
                                                28	  A	  Fischer-­‐	  Lescano	  and	  G	  Teubner,	  ‘Regime-­‐Collisions:	  The	  Vain	  Search	  for	  Legal	  Unity	  in	  the	  Fragmentation	  of	  Global	  Law’	  (2004)	  25	  Michigan	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  999.	  	   29	  	   Gunther	   Teubner,	   “Self-­‐Constitutionalizing	   TNCs?	  On	   the	   Linkage	   of	   "Private"	   and	   "Public"	  Corporate	   Codes	   of	   Conduct”	   ,	   in	   	   Gralf-­‐Peter	   Calliess	   (Hrsg.)	   Governing	   Transnational	  Corporations	  -­‐	  Public	  and	  Private	  Perspectives,	  Indiana	  Journal	  of	  Global	  Legal	  Studies	  17,	  2010.	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be	  evolving	  gradually	  into	  a	  fully-­‐blown	  new	  legal	  order,	  complete	  with	  the	  teeth	  of	   enforceability	   in	  domestic	   courts.	   Seeking	   to	  understand	  how	  soft	   corporate	  codes	   brought	   about	   real	   change	   in	   the	   form	   of	   improved	   labor	   conditions,	  increased	  environmental	  protection	  or	  higher	  human	  rights	  standards,	  Teubner	  notes	   that	   the	   interplay	   of	   private	   and	   public	   codes	   has	   led	   not	   only	   to	   a	  “juridification”	   but	   also	   of	   a	   “constitutionalization”	   of	   their	   content30.	   Such	  transformation	   is	   explained	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   strain	   put	   on	   society	   and	   the	  environment	   by	   globalized	  markets	   and	   corporations	   (unhampered	   by	   nation-­‐state	   counter	   programs)	   through	   “the	   negative	   effects	   of	   their	   own	  differentiation,	  specialization	  and	  high-­‐performance	  orientation",	  has	  reached	  a	  tipping	   point.	   	   	   “It	   is	   only	   a	   question	   of	   time	   until	   the	   released	   energies	   trigger,	  
apart	  from	  positive,	  also	  such	  negative	  effects	  that	  emerging	  social	  conflicts	  force	  a	  
drastic	  correction”.	  	  20.	  What	  matters	  here,	  he	  says,	  is	  “learning	  pressures,	  i.e.	  internal	  changes	  
induced	  by	  external	  constraints”31.	  Evocative	  of	   the	  external	  and	   internal	  spaces	  of	  contestation	  present	  in	  Katerina	  Pistor’s	  analysis,	  Teubner’s	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  “both	  elements	  have	  to	  be	  present	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  public	  and	  private	  codes	  to	  act	   in	  combination:	  an	  internal	  change	  of	  cognitive	  and	  normative	  structures	  and	  
external	  pressure	  directed	  towards	  it…”.	  The	  tipping	  point	   is	  already	  apparent	   in	  positions	  taken	  by	  domestic	  courts,	  which	  appear to be increasingly ready	  to	  make	  corporate	  codes	  containing	  obligations	  in	  sensitive	  human	  rights	  fields	  “backfire”	  and	  provide	  grounds	  for	  -­‐	  and	  not	  a	  shield	  from	  -­‐	  the	  liability	  of	  their	  conceptor32.	  However,	   clearly,	   such	  a	   transformation,	  announcing	  a	   radical	   reshaping	  of	   the	  contested	   regime	   for	   corporate	   liability	   for	  human	  rights	  violations,	   could	  only	  happen	   if	   the	   various	   institutional	   factors	   needed	   to	   create	   sufficient	   interface	  between	  the	  colliding	  regimes	  were	  actually	  present.	  	  21.	   Drawing	   these	   three	   strands	   of	   scholarship	   together	   in	   the	   specific	  context	   of	   the	   international	   investment	   arbitration,	   it	   seems	   therefore	   that	   the	  next	  avenue	  must	  therefore	  be	  a	  search	  for	  sites	  where	  the	  requisite	  processes	  for	  elaboration	  and	  reformulation,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  human	  rights,	  may	  take	  place33.	  
                                                30	  The	   concept	   of	   “constitutionalization”	   requires	   some	   explanation:	   	   «	  Corporate	   codes	   fulfil	  constitutional	   functions	   in	   a	   twofold	   sense:	   They	   establish	   constitutive	   rules	   for	   corporate	  autonomy	  and	  –	  at	  present	  increasingly	  –	  limitative	  rules	  meant	  to	  counter	  their	  socially	  harmful	  tendencies….Corporate	  codes	  need	  to	  be	  characterized	  as	  constitutions	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  if	  they	  develop	   features	   typical	   for	   a	   constitution	   –	   double	   reflexivity	   and	   binary	   meta-­‐coding”	   (p.5	  above	  note	  21). 	  31 	  “Behind	   the	   metaphor	   of	   "voluntary	   codes",	   therefore,	   lies	   anything	   but	   voluntariness.	  Transnational	   corporations	   enact	   their	   codes	   neither	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   understanding	   of	  common	   good	   requirements	   nor	   due	   to	   motives	   of	   corporate	   ethics.	   They	   comply	   only	  "voluntarily",	   when	   massive	   learning	   pressures	   on	   them	   are	   exerted	   from	   the	   outside.	   The	  learning	  process	  does	  not	  proceed	  within	  the	  legal	  system	  from	  code	  to	  code	  via	  validity	  transfer	  of	   rules,	   but	   on	   a	   long-­‐winding	   detour	   through	   other	   social	   systems	   and	   other	   media	   of	  communication.”	  (p.16,	  above	  FN56).	  	  32	  For	  examples	  in	  case	  involving	  the	  corporate	  codes	  of	  Nike	  and	  Total,	  see	  “Private	  international	  law	  beyond	  the	  Schism”,	  	  p.416.	  	  33	  In	  areas	  of	  public	  law,	  the	  lessons	  drawn	  from	  the	  Solange	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  “overlapping	  consensus”	  are	  not	  dissimilar	  (see	  J	  Cohen	  and	  C	  Sabel,	  ‘Directly-­‐Deliberative	  Polyarchy’	  (1997)	  3	  
European	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Once	   again,	   this	   may	  mean	   creating	   spaces	   for	   productive	   contestation	   of	   the	  investment	   regime.	   To	   return	   again	   the	  Belize	   example,	   “the	  major	   impetus	   for	  
change	   came	   from	   institutional	   regimes	   outside	   Belize,	   specifically	   from	   the	  
increasing	  recognition	  of	  (collective)	  customary	   land	  use	  practices	  as	  enforceable	  
property	   rights.	   By	   appealing	   to	   law	   and	   legality	   as	   the	   source	   of	   legitimacy	   for	  
resolving	   the	   dispute,	   the	   plaintiffs	   and	   their	   representatives	   created	   an	   opening	  
for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Belize	  to	  follow	  international	  and	  foreign	  examples	  (not	  
precedents	   in	   any	   formal	   sense)	   and	   to	   embrace	   similar	   legal	   arguments,	  
notwithstanding	  political	  pressure	  to	  the	  contrary”34.	   For	   the	   investment	   regime	  to	  integrate	  transformative	  values	  of	  mutuality	  of	  obligations	  and	  accountability,	  ultimately	  enforceable	  moreover	  through	  its	  own	  arbitration	  processes,	  we	  need	  therefore	   to	   explore	   its	   interfaces	  with	   human	   rights	   in	   order	   to	  make	   a	   legal	  case	  for	  change.	  	  
II.	   –	   The	  missing	   link	   (or	   how	   home	   state	   commitments	   to	   human	  
rights	   through	   the	   investment	   regime	   could	   migrate	   to	   investment	  
arbitration)	  	  22.	  Contestation	  of	  property	  rights	  under	  the	  investment	  regime	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  rights	  might	  take	  place	  in	  several	  different	  places.	   In	  many	  cases,	  the	  victims	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  will	  be	  indigenous	  peoples	  who	  complain	  that	  their	  property,	  cultural	  or	  ecological	  interests	  were	  sacrificed	  by	  the	  government	  to	  the	  foreign	  investor,	  to	  whom	  for	  instance	  land,	  or	  the	  exploitation	  of	  natural	  resources,	  was	  conceded.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  collective	  right	  invoked	  appears	  to	  be	   in	   direct	   collision	   with	   the	   content	   of	   a	   contractual	   or	   treaty	   conferred	  property	  right.	  This	  well	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Belize	  case	  discussed	  above.	  In	  other	  instances,	   it	   may	   be	   less	   the	   content	   of	   the	   contract	   than	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	  investor	   which	   is	   the	   source	   of	   the	   violation;	   for	   instance,	   violence,	   pollution,	  deforestation	  or	  various	  other	  abuses	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  part	  of	   the	  contractual	  package35.	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  the	   investment	  regime	  leave	  room	  for	  these	  two	  categories	   of	   human	   rights	   concerns?	   While	   structural	   bias	   may	   disqualify	  arbitration	  tribunals	  as	  a	  likely	  forum	  for	  transformative	  arguments,	  incremental	  change	   may	   take	   place	   through	   interpretative	   techniques	   (1).	   More	   radical	  moves	  may	   be	   expected	   in	   regional	   human	   rights	   courts,	   but	   research	   on	   this	  point	   highlights	   structural	   dissymmetry	   between	   the	   obligations	   of	   capital-­‐importing	  states	  (2),	  and	  the	  legal	  duties	  of	  the	  home	  states	  of	  investors	  (3).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23.	  1.	  -­‐	  What	  then	  should	  an	  arbitrator	  do	  if	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  violation	  of	   a	   human	   right	   not	  mentioned	   in	   the	   contract	   and	  moreover	   not	   part	   of	   the	  sources	   of	   contractually	   applicable	   law?	   There	   are	   obviously	   several	   possible	  responses36.	  Many	   arbitrators	  position	   themselves	  upon	   a	  purely	   jurisdictional	  
                                                                                                                                      	  34	  Katharina	  Pistor,	  op	  cit,	  p.17.	  
35 These	  are	   typically	   instances	   for	  which	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  use	   the	  resources	  of	   the	  Alien	   Tort	   Statute	   in	   the	  US.	  While	   clearly	   litigation	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   statute	   allows	   for	   the	  migration	  of	  legal	  norms	  (as	  shown	  by	  Scott	  &	  Wai,	  op	  cit),	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	   the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  on	   this	  point	  at	   the	   time	  of	  writing	  has	   led	  us	   to	  exclude	   its	  specific	  consideration	  here. 
36 See the excellent overviews of arbitral awards proposed by Kriebaum op cit, p. 178 et s ; Jacob, op 
cit, sub § 2.1. ; Fry, op cit, p. 83 s.  
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terrain	  to	  decline	  to	  bring	  human	  rights	  issues	  into	  a	  strictly	  contractual	  dispute.	  Some	  accept	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  weighing	  process	  that	  now	  accompanies	  collisions	  of	  rights	  in	  human	  rights	  fora,	  with	  no	  mandate	  other	  than	  the	  demands	  of	  equity	  within	   the	   applicable	   law.	   This	   approach	   includes	   “factoring	   in”	   human	   rights	  into	  the	  calculus	  of	  compensation	  due	  to	  the	  investor.	  Others	  use	  techniques	  of	  interpretation	  to	  integrate	  the	  persuasive	  authority	  of	  human	  rights	  case-­‐law	  in	  the	  reading	  of	  concepts	  used	  by	  the	  applicable	  law,	  or	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  scope	   and	   density	   of	   rights	   to	   which	   it	   might	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly	   defer.	  References	   to	   judicial	   rulings	   and	   dicta	   are	   frequent	   when	   defining	   key	  categories	   in	   investment	   treaties.	   While	   many	   of	   these	   cross-­‐references	   have	  served	   to	   cement	   the	   protection	   of	   investor	   property	   rights	   (through	   the	  definition	   of	   expropriation,	   for	   instance),	   a	   body	   of	   arbitral	   doctrine	   more	  favorable	  to	  a	  rebalancing	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  investment	  relationship	  in	  favor	  of	  the	   host	   state	   has	   been	   growing	   incrementally.	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   under	   the	  doctrine	  of	  “police	  powers”,	  a	  host	  state	  may	  escape	  any	  duty	  to	  compensate	  for	  economic	   harm	   that	   is	   a	   consequence	   of	   bona	   fide	   regulation	   designed	   to	  enhance	   the	  general	  welfare	   (in	   fields	   such	  as	  public	  health	  or	   safety,	   taxation,	  cultural	  property	  and,	  far	  more	  controversially,	  environmental	  protection)	  37.	   
 24.	  Certain	  NAFTA	  decisions	  are	  perceived	  moroever	  to	  display	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  wider	   context	   in	   which	   investment	   takes	   place,	   highlighting	   its	   public	  dimension38.	   As	   Katarina	   Pistor	   has	   pointed	   out,	   “context”	   here	   is	   typically	   a	  proxy	   for	   interdependencies	   between	   an	   institutional	   regime	   and	   its	   systemic	  environment39.	   It	   is	   used	   to	   allow	   a	   more	   holistic	   perspective	   on	   investment,	  which	   then	   appears	   embedded	   in	   a	   larger	   package	   of	   economic	   and	   social	  relations. To	  this	  extent,	  therefore,	  the	  multilateral	  investment	  treaty	  may	  make	  more	  room	  for	  human	  rights	  considerations	  than	  BITs.	  According	  to	  Mark	  Jacobs,	  its	  multi-­‐faceted	   design	  might	   help	   to	   explain	  why	   its	   investment	   chapter	   and	  consequently	   also	   certain	   NAFTA	   arbitrations	   do	   not	   seek	   to	   push	   investment	  protection	  to	  the	  maximum,	  a	  tendency	  to	  which	  individual	  BITs	  are	  more	  prone.	  
“Investment	  protection	  is	  increasingly	  seen	  not	  as	  a	  privilege for	  a	  special	  group	  of	  
people	  but	  as	  one	  component	  of	  a	  state’s	  foreign	  and	  economic	  policy	  network	  on	  
matters	  such	  as	  trade,	   industry,	   the	  mobility	  of	  persons	  and	  capital,	  development,	  
                                                
37 On	  the	  unclear	  borderline	  between	  regulatory	  takings	  and	  police	  power,	  see	  Kriebaum,	  op	  cit,	  p.	  178	  et	  s. 
38 Jacob, op cit, sub § 2.2.1 (citing  Glamis Gold, Ltd v United States of America (Glamis), 
NAFTA Ch.11 Tribunal, Award, 8 June 2009, paras 5-8) but concluding that there remains 
“ample	   uncertainty...	  While	   the	   purpose	   of	   regulation	   is	   increasingly	   being	   factored	   into	   arbitral	  
decisions,	  public	  welfare	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  definite	  trump	  card.	  States	  managing	  public	  affairs	  with	  
human	  rights	   in	  mind	  will	   likely	  continue	  to	   find	  themselves	  at	   the	  receiving	  end	  of	  expropriation	  
claims”. 
 
 39	  Pistor,	  p.1.	  «	  The	  context	  metaphor,	  of	  course,	  can	  also	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  broader	  social	  system,	  that	  is,	  the	  structures	  that	  determine	  the	  collective	  reproduction	  of	  allocative	  and	  authoritative	  resources	  in	  a	  given	  system”.	  	  	  
 
 15 
and	  the	  environment”40.  
 	   25. Arbitration	  may	  therefore	  be	   less	  of	  an	  unlikely	   forum	  for	  change	  within	  the	   investment	   regime	   than	   global	   trends	   in	   awards	   would	   tend	   to	   show.	  However,	   the	  whole	   arbitration	   regime	   is	   nevertheless	   affected	  by	   a	   structural	  defect	   which	   requires	   that	   arbitrators	   decide	   as	   purely	   contractual	   disputes,	  situations	  which	  clearly	  create	  negative	  externalities	  for	  unrepresented	  interests	  (whether	  local	  or	  indeed	  foreign,	  in	  cases	  of	  cross-­‐border	  pollution	  for	  instance).	  Procedurally,	  the	  difficulty	  is	  then	  whether	  to	  allow	  third	  party	  interventions	  or	  amicus	   briefs.	   While	   a	   trend	   seems	   to	   be	   appearing	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   former41,	  many	  arbitrators	  are	  nevertheless	  ill	  at	  ease	  with	  such	  interferences,	  which	  point	  to	   legitimacy	   conflicts	   within	   the	   whole	   system.	   A	   recent	   ICSID	   arbitration	  rejecting	   requests	   for	   amicus	   intervention	   by	   human	   rights	   groups	   and	  indigenous	   communities,	   in	   a	   case	   asserted	   to	   “raise	   critical	   questions	   of	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  which	  engage	  both	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  Zimbabwean	  state	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  investor	  company,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  affected	  indigenous	  peoples” well	   illustrates	   this	   arbitral	   caution42.	   The	   arbitrators	   felt	  that	  the	  submissions	  did	  not	  address	  an	  issue	  which	  came	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  dispute.	  Clearly,	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  conclusions	  outlined	  above,	  the	  impetus	  for	  greater	  consideration	  of	  human	  rights	  needs	  to	  come	  from	  outside	  the	  regime.	   
 26.	  2.	   -­‐	  Of	   the	   various	   courts	   entrusted	  with	  human	   rights	   adjudication,	  the	  only	  one	  to	  date	  to	  have	  brushed	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  with	  the	  international	  investment	  regime,	  is	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  However,	  two	  obvious	   limits	   on	   the	   Court’s	   action	   are	   immediately	   apparent.	   Firstly,	   the	  judicial	   process	   is	   triggered	   by	   claims	   against	   the	   host	   state,	   not	   against	   the	  private	   investor.	   Moreover,	   secondly,	   since	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Court	  obviously	   covers	  non-­‐contractual	   claims	  against	   the	  host	   state	   –	   that	   is,	   claims	  based	  on	  the	  violation	  of	  human	  rights,	  distinct	  from	  claims	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  investment	  regime	  as	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  state	  contract	  or	  covered	  by	  a	  bilateral	   treaty	   -­‐	  brought	  against	   the	  host	  state,	   the	   typical	  scenario	   is	  one	   in	  which	   third	   parties	   challenge	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	   an	   investment	   regime	   in	  respect	  of	   their	   own	   rights	  or	   interests.	  The	  problem	   then	  becomes	  one	  of	   the	  accountability	  of	   the	   state	   for	   the	  actions	  of	   the	  private	   contractor43.	  Typically,	  when	  the	  claim	  is	  successful,	  the	  host/defendant	  state	  is	  judged	  to	  have	  positive	  obligations	  to	  ensure	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  exercised.	  	  
                                                
40 Jacob, op cit, sub § 6.3 41	  Notably,	  the	  US	  Model	  BIT	  (2004)	  provides	  for	  a	  tribunal	  to	  have	  the	  authority	  both	  to	  accept	  submissions	  from	  non-­‐disputing	  parties	  and	  provide	  of	  documents	  to	  the	  wider	  public.	  
 
42 See BERNHARD	  VON	  PEZOLD	  AND	  OTHERS	  (CLAIMANTS)	  v.	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  ZIMBABWE	  (RESPONDENT)	  (ICSID	  CASE	  NO.	  ARB/10/15).	  	  
 
43 For	   a	   classic	   instance	   involving	   abuses	   committed	  by	  Coca	  Cola’s	  Guatemalan	   subsidiary,	   for	  which	  Guatemala	  was	  held	  liable	  by	  the	  InterAmerican	  Commission:	  See	  case	  4425	  (Guatemala)	  25	  June	  1982	  (IACHR	  1980-­‐81).	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  27.	  While	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  potential	  conflicts	  thus	  appear	  to	  be	  relatively	  simple,	  the	  human	  rights	  claims	  made	  in	  such	  cases	  are	  nevertheless	  problematic	  for	  two	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  structural,	  and	  connected	  to	  the	  liberal	  Westphalian	  paradigm	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   both	   the	   investment	   regime	   and	   the	   regional	  human	  rights	  regime	  were	  designed.	  Both	  assume	  that	   the	   interests	  of	  affected	  communities	   are	   aligned	  on	   those	  of	   the	   state.	   Thus,	   in	   theory,	   neither	   type	  of	  conflict	   between	   the	   investment	   regime	   and	   the	   rights	   of	   affected	   local	  communities	   should	   exist.	   If	   the	   violation	   is	   alleged	   to	   stem	   from	   the	   contract,	  the	  theory	  goes	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  such	  communities	  were	  represented	  in	  the	  negotiation	  process	  by	  the	  territorial	  sovereign,	  while	  the	  benefit	  accruing	  to	  the	  state	  in	  terms	  of	  foreign	  investment	  is	  also	  their	  own.	  Similarly,	  if	  the	  violation	  is	  linked	  to	  abusive	  conduct	  of	  the	  investor,	  the	  state	  supposedly	  has	  the	  means	  to	  take	   care	   of	   its	   own	   and	   call	   the	   investor	   to	   account	   under	   the	   terms	   of	   the	  contract	   or	   the	   bilateral	   treaty	   with	   the	   investor’s	   home	   state.	   However,	   the	  assumption	   of	   alignment	   of	   governmental	   interests	   and	   those	   of	   local	  communities	  is	  clearly	  overly	  optimistic.	  Indeed,	  cases	  where	  the	  defendant/host	  state	  is	  condemned	  for	  violation	  of	  human	  rights	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (neglect	  of	  property	  rights,	  or	  abusive	  conduct	  insufficiently	  discouraged)	  clearly	  signal	  that	  the	  supposed	  alignment	  does	  not	  exist.	  	  	  28.	  The	  difficulty,	  however,	  is	  that	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  obligation	  to	  provide	  compensation	  to	  the	  private	  investor	  will	  come	  out	  of	  fiscal	  revenue.	  Once	  again,	  this	   makes	   sense	   when	   interests	   of	   the	   host	   state,	   party	   to	   the	   contractual	  investment	  arrangement,	  and	  the	  affected	  communities,	  are	  aligned.	   	  When	  this	  is	  not	  so,	  those	  who	  bear	  the	  burden	  either	  of	  governmental	  shortsightedness	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  short	  term	  benefits	  (or	  corruption	  of	  officials),	  or	  of	  the	  regulatory	  competition	  which	  makes	  it	  unavoidable	  to	  accept	  the	  investment	  arrangements	  on	  the	  investor’s	  terms,	  are	  always	  the	  uncompetitive,	  immobile	  local	  workforce	  or	   inhabitants.	   At	   best	   in	   such	   a	   case,	   the	   host	   state	   will	   be	   torn	   between	  conflicting	  loyalties	  and	  obligations,	  of	  which	  one	  may	  be	  imposed	  by	  the	  Court,	  the	  other	  by	  arbitration.	  It	  may	  decide	  it	  has	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  pull	  out	  of	  one	  or	  the	   other.	   This	   is	   what	   happened	   when	   Ecuador	   walked	   out	   of	   ICSID	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	  Chevron	  saga.	  Why	  not,	  then,	  look	  to	  the	  investor’s	  home	  state	  in	  order	  to	  ensure,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  non-­‐abusive	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  investor	  	  in	   its	   activities	   abroad?	  Here	   there	  may	   be	   a	   significant	   role	   for	   the	   European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  	  	  	   29.	  3-­‐.	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECtHR)	  appears	  to	  be	  out	  of	  the	   fray,	  as	   far	  as	  collisions	  between	  the	  human	  rights	  and	   investment	  regimes	  are	   concerned.	   The	   reason	   is	   twofold.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   beyond	   the	   right	   to	  private	  property,	   the	   first-­‐generation	   individual	   liberal	   rights	  written	  up	   in	   the	  Convention	  are	  less	  immediately	  likely	  to	  enter	  into	  conflict	  with	  an	  investment	  regime	  than	  second-­‐generation	  rights	  to	  water	  or	  food.	  	  This	  hurdle	  may	  be	  more	  apparent	  than	  real,	  however,	  given	  the	  interpretative	  resources	  already	  used	  in	  many	   instances	   by	   the	   Court.	   Article	   2	   and	   the	   right	   to	   life	  might	   provide	   the	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legal	  basis	  for	  such	  rights,	  44.	  Similarly,	  article	  8	  has been successfully invoked with 
regard to pollution by waste treatment facilities and fertilizer factories.	  Moreover,	  the	  Court	   has	   developed	   various	   techniques	   (such	   as	   so	   called	   “pilot	   cases”)	   by	  which	  it	  can	  deal	  with	  plural	  applications,	  or	  ensure	  collective	  effect	  to	  its	  rulings	  (for	   instance,	   on	   issues	   such	   as	   immigration	   or	   discrimination	   concerning	   the	  Rom	  people45).	  	  	  30.	   But,	   the	   second	   reason	   for	   which	   the	   European	   court	   has	   not	   been	  involved	  to	  a	  similar	  extent	  in	  disputes	  linked	  to	  foreign	  investment	  regime	  is	  the	  status	   of	   many	   of	   the	   European	   Member	   states	   who	   are,	   or	   at	   least	   were	  traditionally,	   capital-­‐	   exporting	   states	   rather	   than	   hosts	   to	   foreign	   investment.	  This	   asymmetry	   in	   respect	  of	   the	   situation	  of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court,	  whose	  members	   are	   largely	   capital	   importers,	   means	   that	   the	   European	   states	   will	  usually	  appear	  as	  home	  countries	   to	   the	  private	   investor.	  Therefore,	   they	  have	  not	  been	  concerned	  by	  the	  investment	  arbitration	  as	  host	  states	  under	  BITs,	  and	  have	   not	   therefore	   found	   themselves	   in	   circumstances	   of	   divided	   loyalty,	  towards	  the	  investor	  and	  towards	  the	  local	  population,	  which	  are	  generated	  by	  regulatory	  competition	  for	  capital.	  	  	  31.	   This	   asymmetry	   is	   clearly	   problematic.	   It	   adds	   to	   the	   already	   one-­‐sided	   nature	   of	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   arrangements.	   While	   the	   host	   state	  may	   be	   doubly	   subject	   to	   arbitration	   and	   human	   rights	   obligations,	   the	   home	  state	  appears	   to	  be	  correlatively	  beyond	   the	  pale.	   In	   turn,	   this	  puts	   the	  private	  investor	   in	   a	   particularly	   comfortable	   position,	   because,	   benefiting	   from	   a	  unilateral	  option	  to	  take	  the	  disputes	  to	  arbitration	  under	  the	  investment	  treaty,	  it	   is	  also	  free	  from	  horizontal	  obligations	  under	  a	  human	  rights	  regime.	   	   It	  may	  therefore	  be	  time	  to	  think	  again,	  and	  reconsider	  the	  interface,	  or	  the	  potential	  for	  interdependency,	  between	  human	  rights	  and	   investment	  on	  the	   investor’s	  side.	  This	  may	  not	  simplify	  matters,	  of	  course,	  since	  it	  is	  potentially	  likely	  to	  enhance	  the	   global	   disorder	   in	   places	   which	   now	   appear	   to	   be	   consensual,	   or	   at	   least	  uncontested	   for	   want	   of	   contestants.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   may	   also	   be	   the	  opportunity	   to	   consider	   the	   productive	   impact	   of	   contestation,	   in	   which	  legitimacy	   issues	  may	  be	   fought	   out	   in	   legal	   terms	   rather	   than	   kept	   below	   the	  surface.	  The	  system	  will	  work	  as	  such,	  as	  Katarina	  Pistor	  reminds	  us,	  if	  it	  has	  the	  “glue”	   needed	   to	   keep	   the	   competing	   regimes	   in	   conversation	   over	   issues	   of	  legitimacy.	  	  	  
 
                                                44	  Indeed,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  it	  could	  ground	  the	  right	  to	  development	  altogether.	  As	  suggested	  by	   James	   Fry	   (op	   cit,	   p.104),	   “	   it	   might	   be	   enough	   that	   BITs	   deny	   states	   the	   opportunity	   to	  develop	   in	  order	   to	  denounce	   these	  agreements,	   since,	  as	  Mary	  Robinson	  has	  stated,	   ‘Denial	  of	  the	  right	  to	  development	  puts	  all	  other	  rights	  at	  risk.’”.	  
45	  For	  example,	  see	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  (GC	  16	  March	  2010,	  Oršuš	  v.	  Croatia	  ,	  Req.	  no	   15766/03):	   discrimination	   against	   Rom	   children	   in	   schools).	   The	   Court	   has	   developed	   the	  means	   to	   effect	   structural	   changes	   in	   the	   domestic	   legal	   order	   of	  Member	   states,	   and	  uses	   the	  technique	  of	  “pilot	  cases”	  to	  respond	  to	  violation	  of	  collective	  social	  and	  economic	  rights	  –	  here,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  article	  14	  (prohibition	  of	  discrimination).	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32.	  How	  then	  could	  an	  investment	  dispute	  reach	  the	  European	  Court?	  One	  (unlikely)	   case	  would	  arise	   in	   the	   context	  of	   a	   request	   for	   enforcement,	  before	  the	  courts	  of	  a	  third,	  European	  Contracting	  State,	  of	  an	  arbitral	  award	  obtained	  by	  a	  private	  investor	  against	  a	  third,	  host	  state.	  However,	  this	  avenue	  is	  excluded	  in	   ICSID	   arbitrations,	   at	   least	   when	   the	   enforcement	   state	   is	   also	   a	   party	   to	  ICSID46.	  But	  could	  one	  imagine	  that	  a	  claim	  be	  brought	  by	  the	  same	  indigenous	  people	   harmed	   either	   by	   expropriation	   or	   by	   tortious	   activity	   by	   a	   local	  domiciliary/citizen	  investor	  in	  the	  context	  of	  activities	  in	  the	  host	  state?	  At	  first	  glance,	   redress	   -­‐	   or	   at	   least,	   human	   rights	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   claim	   -­‐	   would	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  very	   least	   that	  should	  be	  provided	   in	  cases	  of	  abusive	  activity	  abroad	  by	  a	   local	   individual	  or	  corporation,	  surely	  subject	  to	  the	   jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court.	  	  But	  such	  a	  claim	  is	  likely	  to	  encounter	  unexpected	  hurdles.	  Under	  the	  case-­‐law	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   (which	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   differ	   from	  international	  law	  in	  general	  on	  this	  point),	  while	  positive	  obligations	  of	  the	  home	  state	   would	   certainly	   extend	   to	   preventing	   its	   citizens	   from	   causing	   harm	   at	  home,	  they	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  extend	  extraterritorially,	  so	  that	  claims	  arising	  out	  of	  tortious	  acts	  in	  foreign	  lands	  are	  not	  justiciable	  when	  not	  caused	  by	  a	  public	  official47.	  The	  legal	  explanation	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  state	  liability	  for	   acts	   committed	   abroad	   rests	   on	   an	   agency	   foundation;	   such	   liability	   is	   not	  engaged	  therefore,	  by	  the	  conduct	  of	  private	  actors,	  the	  state	  being	  accountable	  only	   for	   the	   conduct	  of	   the	  agents	  which	   represent	   it	   elsewhere.	   	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   while	   acts	   committed	   by	   private	   citizens	  may	   generate	   liability	   under	   a	  theory	  of	  positive	  obligations,	   these	  arise	  only	  on	  home	  ground,	   that	   is,	  within	  
                                                46	  In	  contrast	  to	  awards	  in	  commercial	  arbitration	  governed	  by	  the	  New	  York	  Convention,	  where	  the	  public	  policy	  exception	   (or,	   alternatively,	   the	   inarbitrability	  of	   the	  dispute)	  may	  be	  used	   to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  rights	  if	  patently	  violated,	  the	  ICSID	  arbitration	  framework	  provides	  for	  directly	  enforceability	  against	  the	  host	  state.	  Under	  article	  53,	  enforcement	  of	  ICSID	  awards	  must	  not	  be	  made	  subject	  to	  conditions	  for	  their	  recognition	  and	  enforcement	  not	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  Convention.	  Nor	  is	  it	  permissible	  to	  subject	  them	  to	  review	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  their	  recognition	  and	   enforcement.	   In	   the	   process	   of	   recognition	   and	   enforcement,	   the	   domestic	   court’s	   task	   is	  limited	   to	   verifying	   the	   authenticity	   of	   the	   ICSID	   awards.	   It	   may	   not	   re-­‐examine	   the	   ICSID	  tribunal’s	   jurisdiction.	   It	  may	  not	   re-­‐examine	   the	  award	  on	   the	  merits.	  Nor	  may	   it	  examine	   the	  fairness	   and	  propriety	  of	   the	  proceedings	  before	   the	   ICSID	   tribunal.	  Not	   even	   the	  ordre	  public	  (public	  policy)	  of	  the	  State	  where	  recognition	  and	  enforcement	  of	  an	  ICSID	  award	  is	  sought,	  is	  a	  valid	   ground	   for	   a	   refusal	   to	   recognize	   and	   enforce	   (see	   UNCTAD	   Report	   2003	   on	   Dispute	  




	  47	  For	  an	  excellent	  overview	  and	  analysis,	  see	  Jacco	  Bomhoff,	  «	  The	  Reach	  of	  Rights	  :	  The	  Foreign	  and	   the	   Private	   in	   Conflict	   of	   Laws,	   State	   Action,	   and	   Fundamental	   Rights	   Cases	  with	   Foreign	  Elements	  »,	  70	  Law	  and	  Contemorary	  Problems	  39	  (2008).	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the	  limits	  of	  the	  defendant	  state’s	  territory.	  A	  (perhaps	  not-­‐so-­‐curious?)	  vestige	  of	  territoriality	  therefore	  shelters	  the	  private	  actors	  in	  their	  activity	  abroad.	  	  33.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  a	  missing	  link,	  preventing	  the	  extraterritorial	  extension	  of	   any	   positive	   obligation	   of	   the	   home	   state	   to	   ensure	   that	   its	   citizens	   or	  corporations	   respect	   Convention	   rights	   when	   exercising	   an	   economic	   activity.	  This	   immunity	   for	   the	   acts	   of	   private	   actors	   abroad	   is	   provided	   by	   the	  public/private	   divide.	   It	   may	   be	   however	   that	   the	   international	   investment	  regime	  -­‐	  commonly	  cited	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  blurring	  of	  traditional	  distinctions	  -­‐	  provides	  the	  means	  to	  cross	  it.	  A	  state	  which	  has	  encouraged	  its	  own	  citizens	  or	  corporations	   to	   take	   up	   the	   opportunities	   laid	   out	   by	   the	   bilateral	   investment	  agreement	   is	   surely	   accountable	  when	   their	   actions	   then	   lead	   to	   abuse?	  Might	  the	  river-­‐dwellers	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  Delta	  not	  complain	  that	  the	  home	  state	  of	  Shell	  has	   not	   provided	   sufficient	   control	   of	   its	   economic	   agents?48	  Such	   obligations	  could	  also	  of	  course	  be	  invoked	  horizontally,	  in	  that	  the	  national	  courts	  bound	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  (and	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Court)	  would	  be	  obliged	  in	  turn	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  such	  obligations,	  in	  all	  those	  relationships	  between	  claimant	  and	  investor	  which	  fell	  within	  their	  jurisdiction,	  notably	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  domicile	  of	  the	  defendant.	  	  	  34.	  Reciprocity	  which	  is	  lacking	  in	  the	  whole	  investment	  regime	  could	  be	  at	  least	  partially	  restored.	  If	  BITs	  were	  not	  formally	  renegotiated	  so	  as	  to	  impose	  human	  rights	  obligations	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  investor	  and	  reduce	  at	   least	   in	  part	  the	  one-­‐sidedness	  of	  treaty	  (or	  contractual)	  arrangements,	  they	  could	  be	  re-­‐read	  this	   way	   by	   courts	   outside	   the	   arbitral	   forum,	   and	   ultimately,	   through	   the	  processes	  of	  collision,	  contestation	  and	  migration	  of	  norms,	  before	  the	  latter.	  By	  opening	   up	   this	   space	   for	   legal	   contestation,	   this	   “rougher”	   account	   of	   global	  legal	   change	   –	   with	   its	   own	   obvious	   risks	   and	   perils49	  -­‐	   might	   lead	   to	   a	   far-­‐
                                                48	  This	  example	   is	  borrowed	   from	  the	  Kiobel	   case	   (Kiobel	  v	  Royal	  Dutch	  Petroleum	  Co,	  621	  F	  3d	  111,	  142	  n	  44,	  2d	  Cir.	  2010).	  The	   literature	  on	   this	   case	   is	   already	   so	  voluminous,	  particularly	  given	  the	  numerous	  other—dissonant—decisions	  that	  have	  been	  handed	  down	  more	  recently	  in	  other	  circuits,	   that,	  since	  certiorari	  has	  now	  been	  granted	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	   it	   is	  no	  doubt	  wiser	  to	  direct	   the	  attention	  of	  non-­‐US	  readers	  to	  the	  various	  amicus	  briefs,	   including	  the	  brief	  for	   the	   US	   government	   in	   support	   of	   the	   petitioners.	   See,	   for	   an	   update	   on	   the	   multiple	  procedures	  pending,	  S	  Symeonides,	  ‘Choice	  of	  Law	  in	  the	  American	  Courts	  in	  2011:	  Twenty-­‐Fifth	  Annual	  Survey’	  (2012)	  60	  American	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  64,	  and	  for	  a	  synthesis	  in	  French	  of	  the	  litigation	  and	  the	  various	  legal	  issues	  involved,	  H	  Muir	  Watt,	  ‘Les	  enjeux	  de	  l’affaire	  Kiobel	  devant	   la	  Cour	  Suprême	  des	  Etats-­‐Unis:	   la	  responsabilité	  des	  personnes	  morales	  au	  regard	  des	  droits	  de	  l’homme’	  (2012)	  Comité	  français	  de	  Droit	  international	  privé	  (forthcoming).	  	  	  
49 There is no guarantee that contestation itself may not lead to deadlock, when, as Katharina Pistor 
describes it, shared sources of legitimacy are eroded. Both regional human rights Courts are 
encountering deep contestation of their own legitimacy. At the time of writing, the Lexisnexis 
International and Foreign Law Community blog (07/26/2012 10:25:00 PM EST) posts: “Venezuela 
Abandons the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”. The Court is accused of anti-governmental 
bias. There has been equally strong opposition in Brazil, when, in April 2011, the Court issued 
precautionary measures in favour of indigenous communities of the Xingu River and ordered the 
Brazilian government to halt the construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam project. Meanwhile, 
in Europe, the European Court has had to brave the Brighton Conference, with similar British claims 
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that the Court is interfering with national sovereignty (over the prisoners’ rights blanket ban). This is of 
course another story.  
 
 
